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Abstract
The reinsurance market is the secondary market for insurance risks. It has
a very specic organization. Direct insurers rarely trade risks with each
other. Rather, they cede part of their primary risks to specialized profes-
sional reinsurers who have no primary business. This paper o¤ers a model of
equilibrium in reinsurance and capital markets in which professional reinsur-
ers arise endogenously. Their role is to monitor primary insurers credibly, so
that insurers can raise capital more easily. In equilibrium, the nancial struc-
ture of primary insurers consists of a mix of reinsurance and outside capital.
The comparative statics yield empirical predictions which are broadly in line
with a number of stylized facts from the reinsurance market.
Introduction
The reinsurance market is the secondary market for insurance risks. Reinsur-
ance is an important feature of the non-life insurance industry. According to
the latest global study on external reinsurance released by Swiss Re (1998),
direct non-life insurers have ceded business worth USD 103 billion in 1997.
This corresponds to an average cession rate, or ceded premiums in terms of
direct insurance premiums, of 14%.1
The reinsurance market has a very specic, "pyramidal" organization.
The generic reinsurance deal involves two types of pure players, a primary, or
direct, insurer and professional reinsurers. The primary insurer cedes part of
the risks she underwrites on the primary market to the professional reinsurers.
Professional reinsurers accept such secondary risks, but do not carry out any
primary business. This is not to deny that some risk transfer between direct
insurers who are not part of the same group also takes place. But the bulk
of external reinsurance transactions comply with this pattern. According
to estimates from Swiss Re (1998), the reinsurance business is dominated by
specialized reinsurance companies. Professional reinsurers provide more than
80% of the global reinsurance capacity, with the top four providing around
30% of this capacity.
Economists have provided two theoretical frameworks to analyze reinsur-
1In this paper, we focus on external reinsurance, as opposed to internal reinsurance,
where the former consists of reinsurance transactions completed via the marketplace, while
the latter points at reinsurance arrangements within insurance groups. It is di¢ cult in
general to disentangle external from internal reinsurance in the data, because insurance
accounting norms do not require separate accounting in many countries. The study of
Swiss Re (1998) does deal with market transactions only.
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ance. The rst one, pioneered by Borch (1962), consists in viewing rein-
surance through the lens of optimal risk sharing among risk-averse agents.
Several pieces of evidence suggest, however, that optimal risk sharing is not
the only motive for reinsurance in practice. For instance, studying the rein-
surance demand of a sample of U.S. insurance companies which are not part
of a group, Mayers and Smith (1990) nd that less diversied rms, either ge-
ographically or across business lines, purchase less reinsurance, which seems
inconsistent with the view of reinsurance as a diversication device. More
generally, optimal risk sharing predicts that insurance companies should end
up with a net portfolio equal to a deterministic function of the gross insur-
ance market portfolio. Professional reinsurers do indeed hold very diversied
portfolios, both geographically and across insurance lines, and thus their be-
havior seems in line with the mutualization principle. In contrast, however,
primary insurers use reinsurance mainly to cede risks, so that their net port-
folios are roughly a deterministic function of their own gross portfolios only,
apart from the introduction of reinsurersdefault risk.2
The second framework to analyze reinsurance borrows from corporate
hedging theory. The starting point is to note, as in Mayers and Smith (1990),
that the decision of an insurer to purchase reinsurance resembles the deci-
sion of any non-nancial rm to purchase insurance. Thus, the motivations
that explain why rms hedge and why insurers demand reinsurance may well
be similar. This approach has emphasized that reinsurers, because of their
expertise in risk management, provide real services to primary insurers and
are able to mitigate agency problems within insurance companies. The ev-
2This risk has been historically small: There is no example, to our knowledge, of
contagion via reinsurance in the modern nancial era.
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idence from Mayers and Smith (1990) that less diversied insurers demand
less reinsurance is consistent with this view: highly focused insurers are more
likely to develop the required expertise in-house.
Both approaches leave important points unexplained. They do not o¤er
clear-cut rationales for the pyramidal organization of the market. They also
miss the dual nature of reinsurance. As emphasized by Garven and Lamm-
Tennant (2003), reinsurance is both a risk management and a nancing de-
cision. A su¢ ciently high credit standing is a necessary input for insurance
business (see, e.g., Doherty and Tinic, 1981), and capital and reinsurance
are two (imperfect) substitutes which can be used to meet this requirement.
This is documented by Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003); who nd that
reinsurance demand increases with nancial leverage. That in most pruden-
tial regulations (e.g., the U.S. Risk Based Capital or the European Solvency
Margin), the minimum capital requirement is explicitly reduced by reinsur-
ance purchase is also consistent with this dual nature of reinsurance.
Thus, it seems appropriate to model reinsurance as only one of the levers
available to insurance companies in search of an optimal nancial structure,
and to take into account the interplay of reinsurance and other nancing deci-
sions. This paper o¤ers a parsimonious theory of reinsurance which predicts
the emergence of specialized reinsurers, and which addresses the coordina-
tion of reinsurance and nancing policies. In the model, primary insurance
companies make simultaneous reinsurance and nancial decisions. In equi-
librium, they optimally mix cessions to professional reinsurers and issuance
of outside equity. The key ingredient of our model is a di¤erence in the
relative expertise of risk managers and outside nanciers. This creates a
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moral-hazard problem which may prevent insurance companies from meet-
ing capital requirements with uninformed outside nance. A natural way to
overcome this agency problem is to have insurance companies nanced par-
tially with informed capital. This can be achieved by having insurers supply
reinsurance capacity to each other. If reinsurers have a su¢ cient stake in a
primary portfolio, they are credible monitors in the eyes of outside nanciers,
who then are willing to supply capital. However, if the important resource of
this economy, informed capital, is too scarce, this comes at the cost of some
insurers giving up their primary business to devote their resources entirely
to reinsurance: insurers become professional reinsurers.
Moral hazard is a plausible friction in non-life insurance because of the
inversion of the production cycle and the importance of loss mitigation. The
production costs of an insurance company (claims) are revealed only a long
time after business has been underwritten and premiums paid in. Moreover,
the eventual losses depend heavily upon an insurers ability and e¤orts to
mitigate losses during the run-o¤ period. These e¤orts are unlikely to be
veriable by non-expert outsiders, such as shareholders without a seat on the
board. Indeed, it is not di¢ cult for a claims manager to underreserve, namely,
underestimate the nal value of claims, for several years. Illiquidity does
not precede insolvency as in industries with a normal cycle. The following
statement from Warren Bu¤et in the Berkshire Hathaway 2002 Shareholders
Letter epitomizes that this moral hazard problem is an important concern in
non-life insurance:
"I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to
avoid inadequate reserving. But I cant guarantee success. The
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natural tendency of most casualty-insurance managers is to un-
derreserve, and they must have a particular mindset which, it
may surprise you, has nothing to do with actuarial expertise if
they are to overcome this devastating bias."
As is well acknowledged by practitioners, reinsurers have the ability to
mitigate this problem because: (i) they have more information about claims
and more risk-management skills than outside nanciers; and, (ii) they are in
general involved in a long-run, repeated relationship with ceding companies
who then behave so as to build a reputation. Doherty and Smetters (2002)
nd evidence that reinsurers play a role in loss mitigation, either by monitor-
ing ceding companies or by designing e¢ cient dynamic contracts (experience
rating).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the model and
solves for the equilibrium. Section 2 draws empirical implications from the
comparative statics. Section 3 concludes.
1 Model
The setup is an extension of the model of nancial intermediation developed
by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Roughly, while Holmstrom and Tirole
consider an economy in which entrepreneurs cannot monitor each other,3
this assumption is relaxed here: insurers can monitor each other. First, we
introduce the main building block of the model, capital constraints in the
3"We assume that rms cannot monitor other rms, perhaps because they have insuf-
cient capital to be credible monitors [:::] or because they do not have the informational
expertise."
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primary insurance business. Then, we present the general model, allowing
insurers to reinsure each other, and solve for the equilibria in the reinsurance
and capital markets.
1.1 Capital Constrained Insurers
We consider an economy with a continuum of insurers with unit mass. Each
insurer i 2 [0; 1] contemplates underwriting a primary insurance portfolio Pi.
Throughout the paper, what is referred to as an "insurer" is a close-knit
team made of the top management and inside shareholders (e.g., members
of the board) of an insurance company. This group has control over the risk
management and loss mitigation strategy. Insurance companies, like most
nancial institutions, are more likely to have such skilled top managers and
inside shareholders than industrial rms. In fact, this is required to obtain
a license in most countries.
The model is symmetric for notational simplicity. Each portolio Pi has
the following characteristics. The gross outcome from underwriting it (initial
capital plus premiums plus nancial prots minus claims and administrative
costs) is either nonnegative, with value R, or a large loss. The positive
outcome occurs with probability p if the insurer enters into active loss miti-
gation, or p p if she "shirks." However, loss mitigation is not observable
and comes at the loss of a private benet B: Thus, as is commonplace in
models of moral hazard, e¤ort comes at a cost but enhances the outcome in
the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
This very simple stochastic structure enables us to abstract from any
security design considerations and to focus on organizational issues. The
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results are robust to more realistic claims models provided this rst-order
stochastic dominance property holds.
As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we also make the extreme assump-
tion that portfolios are perfectly positively correlated. This is intended to
emphasize that reinsurance does not hinge on a diversication motive in this
model.
We assume that each insurer needs to commit an amount of capital I
in order to be allowed to underwrite her portfolio. The situation we have
in mind is that potential policyholders are dispersed and/or not nancially
sophisticated, but that they are represented imperfectly by an institution
that acts as their agent, a broker or a regulator. This is in line with the
representation hypothesis for prudential regulation outlined by Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994). By setting a capital requirement, this institution ensures
that the expected default of each insurer is below some threshold. Such a view
of capital as a simple bu¤er underlies the actuarial approaches of insurance
regulation, based on ruin theory, as well as the Value-at-Risk approaches in
banking.
The representative of policyholders may be either a broker who does not
o¤er any business to insurers whose credit rating is too low, or a prudential
authority who does not let insurers operate if they fail to meet a statutory
capital requirement.
Each insurer has an initial net wealth K < I: She can tap competitive
outside investors who have unlimited nancing capacities. In this case, for
simplicity, she makes the investors take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers.
All agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liability. An outside
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investment opportunity is available to all the agents, which yields an expected
return of  > 0:
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); we assume that
pR > (1 + ) I > (p p)R +B:
Thus, insurance is valuable only if insurers mitigate losses actively.
The model is identical to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) so far. If an
insurer nds the funding and underwrites her portolio, she has incentives to
carry out e¢ cient loss mitigation only if her stake in the positive outcome,
RI , is su¢ cient. More precisely, the incentive compatibility constraint is
RI  B
p
:
However, outside nanciers must be willing to participate, i.e.,
p (R RI)  (1 + ) (I  K) :
As a result, insurance is feasible i¤
K  K1  I   p
1 + 

R  B
p

:
"One lends only to the rich." Because active loss mitigation is not veri-
able, insurers need to commit a su¢ cient amount of inside capital so as to
credibly underwrite insurance business. Otherwise, the incentive compatible
contracts do not leave an adequate surplus to outside nanciers. In other
words, the capital requirement I induces an inside capital requirement K1
which increases with I, as well as with the extent of the moral hazard problem
B
p
and the cost of outside capital :
Note that with a more general distribution of claims, the optimal form of
outside nance under our rst-order stochastic dominance assumption would
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be subordinated debt (see Innes, 1990). However, insurers would still have to
commit a su¢ cient initial amount of capital in order for deals to take place.
1.2 Reinsurance
For the balance of the paper, we restrict the analysis to the interesting case
in which B is large, so that
0 < K < K1  I   p
1 + 

R  B
p

:
Insurance remains possible under such circumstances. Indeed, departing
from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we assume that insurers can monitor the
loss mitigation carried out by their fellow insurers, because they are endowed
with the required skills in risk management. Insurers are not as good, how-
ever, at monitoring the loss mitigation by the other insurers as they are in
managing their own risks. One natural reason why primary insurers are only
imperfectly monitored by other insurers is that part of the information rel-
evant to manage claims is by nature "soft." The primary insurer has access
to this soft information because, for instance, she owns the retail network,
while the other insurers only have access to the "hard" information, essen-
tially, that part of the information that is in the books and les of the primary
insurer, but miss the soft part. An example of soft information is the primary
insurers guess about the psychology of the claimholders and thus whether
they are willing to reach a quick compromise or bargain aggressively. Such a
guess is built during an ongoing close interaction with the claimholders, but
is di¢ cult to quantify or describe precisely in an administrative le.4
4see Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2001) for a related discussion of the
soft and hard information relevant for loans decisions in retail banking.
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Formally, if the management of claims deriving from a primary portfolio
i 2 [0; 1] is monitored by other insurers, then:
1. The best they can achieve by monitoring is reducing the primary insurer
is private benet from B to bI < B:
2. Monitoring entails a private cost, cR, shared fairly among the monitor-
ing insurers.
Reinsurance reduces only partially the moral-hazard problem in loss mit-
igation (B reduces to bI), and there is of course no reason outside investors,
who cannot verify primary insurerse¤orts, would have any ability to verify
the monitoring e¤ort.
We assume that
pR  cR > (1 + ) I:
In words, despite the monitoring cost, insurance with active loss mitigation
remains more valuable than the alternative investment opportunity. Also,
we restrict the parameters to
K <
p

R  cR
p

pR  cR I:
This restriction is not necessary, but will enable us to focus on the most
interesting case in which primary insurers tap both reinsurance and outside
capital in equilibrium.
Because the monitoring of loss mitigation by other insurers comes at a
private cost, there is an additional moral-hazard problem. In order to be
credible monitors in the eyes of the outside nanciers, the insurers who mon-
itor a given insurer must have an incentive compatible stake in the outcome.
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Thus, they need to commit some of their capital to this monitoring activity
to nance their share in the surplus. Otherwise stated, they provide rein-
surance capacity to the insurer that they monitor in order to alleviate its
nancing constraints.
Since insurance creates excess value, it is optimal, if feasible, to have each
insurer allocate part of her capital to her primary operations and part to sup-
ply reinsurance capacity to others, so that all the portfolios are underwritten.
However, the following Proposition shows that this rst-best situation cannot
be attained if nancing constraints are too important:
Proposition 1
If 0 < K < K2  I   p1+

R  bI+cR
p

, then, even with reinsurance
arrangements, all the primary risks cannot be underwritten. Thus, some
insurers have to give up their primary business and become professional rein-
surers.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. When a portfolio is reinsured, the
present value of the income which is pledgeable to outside investors is p
1+

R  bI+cR
p

,
because bI
p
and cR
p
are the minimal incentive compatible stakes of the pri-
mary insurer and of her reinsurers, respectively. If this present value is
smaller than the need for outside capital, because inside capital and reinsur-
ance capacity are too small, then the capital requirements cannot be met for
all the portfolios. For the remainder of the paper, we study the case in which
all the primary portfolios cannot be underwritten: we assume from now on
that K < K2:
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1.3 Reinsurers
From Proposition 1, if K < K2, all the primary portfolios cannot be un-
derwritten. Thus, under such circumstances, it is must be the case that
specialized reinsurers, who do not have primary business and who devote
their whole capital to the supply of reinsurance capacity, emerge. We now
study the equilibria in this case. Let  denote the proportion of insurers that
act as pure reinsurers in equilibrium. Thus, the remaining 1    insurers
underwrite the primary portfolio available to them. Let
 =

1  
be the ratio of reinsurers for one primary insurer. This ratio, which will turn
out to fully characterize the equilibrium, may be interpreted as the "cession
rate" in the reinsurance market.
Note that whileK < K2 ensures that there must be specialized reinsurers,
it does not rule out the possibility that primary insurers also supply some
reinsurance capacity with a fraction of their capital. We restrict the analysis
to the equilibria in which the primary insurers do not supply reinsurance
capacity at all, and rather invest their whole capital in their primary business.
We make this restriction because these equilibria are the most tractable, and
also for a more important reason that we outline below, after the derivation
of the equilibria.
There are now two moral hazard problems for a given primary portfolio.
The primary insurer and her reinsurers must both behave. Thus, both the
primary insurer and her reinsurers must have a su¢ cient stake in the positive
outcome. Let RI and RR denote their respective stakes. The residual surplus
can be distributed to outside investors. This determines the quantity of out-
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side nance that can be raised. Any shortfall has to be lled by the primary
insurers capital and KR, the reinsurance capacity, namely, the capital com-
mitted by reinsurers. In equilibrium, primary insurers choose the reinsurance
cover which maximizes their expected prot, and reinsurance and primary
insurance yield the same expected return on informed capital K. Then, each
agent has no incentive to change her specialization. Thus, insurers maximize
RI subject to:
RI  bI
p
(II)
RR  cR
p
(RI)
p (R RI  RR)  (1 + ) (I  K  KR) (OP )
pRI =
1

(pRR   cR)  (1 + )K (IP )
KR = K: (ER)
(II) states that the contract has to be incentive compatible for the pri-
mary insurer of a given portfolio. Her stake must be su¢ ciently high that she
is better o¤managing claims e¢ ciently given she is monitored by reinsurers.
(RI) states that the contract has to be incentive compatible for the rein-
surers of any given portfolio. Their stake must be su¢ ciently high so that
they e¤ectively monitor her.
(OP ) is the outside investorsparticipation constraint.
(IP ) is the participation constraints of primary insurers and reinsurers.
The unitary returns from investing in a primary portfolio or supplying rein-
surance capacity must be equal, so that they are indi¤erent in equilibrium,
and it must be higher than the return of the outside opportunity.
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(ER) states that the market for reinsurance capacity clears.
Note rst that (RI) must be binding in equilibrium: RR = cRp . Reinsur-
ance is more costly than capital because of the monitoring cost cR, so that
insurers optimally minimize their cessions. Thus, substituting into (IP ) ; one
nds that
RI =
1


p p
pp

cR:
Note also that (OP ) must be binding if outside capital is necessary, i.e.,
if K +KR < I. In this case, substituting RI , RR; and KR into (OP ), we get
that the equilibrium cession rate  is the positive root of
2 + I  R = 0;
where8<: I = 1 +
p(R  cRp) (1+)I
(1+)K
R =
p p
(1+)K
 cR
p
:
Note that I and R relate to the respective returns earned by primary in-
surers and reinsurers on a given portfolio, hence the notation. It remains to
verify that for such an :
1. (II) is satised: RI is incentive compatible for the primary insurer.
2. The inequality in (IP ) is satised: Insurers and reinsurers do not prefer
the outside opportunity.
3. Outside capital is required: K +KR < I.
Straightforward algebra shows that the inequality in (IP ) is satised since
pR cR > (1 + ) I, and that outside capital is required because we assumed
K <
p(R  cRp)
pR cR I:
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It is also easy to check that (II) amounts to K  K3 
I  p
1+

R  bI+cR
p

1+(1 pp )
cR
bI
:
The following Proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 2
Let
8<: I = 1 +
p(R  cRp) (1+)I
(1+)K
R =
p p
(1+)K
 cR
p
:
If K  K3 
I  p
1+

R  bI+cR
p

1+(1 pp )
cR
bI
, there is an equilibrium with specialized rein-
surers in which primary insurers use both reinsurance capacity and outside
nance. The equilibrium cession rate  is the positive root of
(X) = X2 + IX   R:
Namely,
 =
1
2
q
2I + 4R   I

:
Proof. See above.
Thus, assuming ex ante identical insurers with similar skills and oppor-
tunity sets, we have exhibited an equilibrium in which specialized reinsurers
emerge and primary insurers mix reinsurance and outside capital. Note that
if monitoring by reinsurers is very e¢ cient, namely if bI ! 0, thenK3 ! 0: In
words, it is always possible to fund some insurance capacity in this economy,
even when there is only a very small amount of informed capital available.
As already mentioned, interestingly, there are also equilibria in which
primary insurers provide some reinsurance capacity. Of course, specialized
reinsurers still arise in these equilibria, as a consequence of K < K2. Note
that the existence of such equilibria only means that we do not predict spe-
cialized reinsurers AND specialized primary insurers. This is not actually a
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weakness of the model, but rather a strength: we mention in the introduc-
tion that while specialized reinsurers are dominant suppliers in the external
reinsurance market, primary insurers also provide some capacity. The equi-
librium we have focused on is actually dominant in the sense that it is the
only one which survives as the informed capital K gets close to K3. The
intuition is simple. If primary insurers supply reinsurance capacity, they re-
duce the amount they invest in their primary portfolio. Thus, the share of
the surplus they can claim shrinks because they must earn the same return
as reinsurers in equilibrium. If their share in the surplus shrinks too much, it
is no longer compatible with their incentive compatibility constraint, which
is binding for K = K3:
At this stage, the reader may wonder why we have ruled out the possibility
of reinsurers raising outside funds. This is because it is actually immater-
ial. All that matters in order to ease the nancial constraint is a su¢ cient
amount of informed nancing (capital of primary insurers and reinsurers) be-
ing committed to a primary portfolio. Once this amount is provided, whether
outside nance transits in reinsurersbalance sheets or not before ending in
primary portfolios is irrelevant.5 This irrelevancy property, which simplies
the analysis, depends crucially upon perfect correlation. Relaxing this as-
sumption would add another benet from reinsurance to the one emphasized
here. Indeed, diversication within reinsurance companies would mitigate
their moral hazard problem, because reinsurance treaties could cross-pledge
each other (see Tirole, 1996, for an exposition of this broad idea, closely re-
lated to the rationale for intermediation pioneered in Diamond, 1984). In this
5This point is similar to the "certication versus intermediation" point made in Holm-
strom and Tirole (1997).
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case, it would be optimal to have reinsurers intermediating outside nance.
The next section studies the comparative statics of this equilibrium.
2 Empirical Implications
In this section, we determine the variations of the equilibrium cession rate 
with respect to the parameters of the model in Proposition 3, then we derive
empirical implications.
Proposition 3
The cession rate  increases with respect to I; cR, and ; and decreases
with respect to K:
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to gain some intuition and interpret these results, it is worth
describing the e¤ect of an increase in  in more detail. If the cession rate in-
creases, primary insurers are more heavily reinsured in the sense that the rein-
surance capacity KR provided to each portfolio increases. Thus, an increase
in the cession rate reduces reinsurance protability. Because primary insur-
ance and reinsurance protabilities cannot di¤er in equilibrium, the stake of
primary insurers in the positive outcome is reduced. This makes more cash
ows pledgeable to outside nanciers, who at the same time have less capital
to commit because KR has increased. As a result, an increase in the ces-
sion rate reduces the protability of insurance and reinsurance while making
outside nance more protable. Eventually, an increase in the cession rate
transfers value from insiders to outsiders to ease nancial constraints.
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A rst testable implication of these comparative static properties is there-
fore that reinsurance capacity and reinsurance protability, both endogenous
in our model, should be inversely related. Weiss and Chung (2004) nd evi-
dence in support of this point in the U.S. property and casualty reinsurance
markets over 1991-1995.
The variation of  with respect to the exogenous parameters described in
Proposition 3 may now be interpreted as follows.
Reinsurance and prudential regulation. The reason  increases with re-
spect to I is clear. If the exogenous capital requirement increases, it means
that more outside nance is required. This increases the stake of outsiders
in the cash ows, or reduces the stake of primary insurers and reinsurers.
Because the stake of reinsurers must remain incentive-compatible, primary
insurers have to reduce their stake. This makes reinsurance more protable
than primary insurance, hence more insurers give up their primary portfolio
to exert reinsurance. As a result, this model delivers the well-known trade-
o¤ between solvency and capacity of the primary insurance market faced by
the regulator. Toughening capital requirements makes rms more solvent
but reduces the number of primary portfolios underwritten (1    = 1
1+
)
and leads to more reinsurance. This relationship between reinsurance and
regulation is well acknowledged by practitioners.
Reinsurance and moral hazard. If cR increases, the share of reinsurers in
the cash ows has to increase, and in turn they have to supply more capacity;
hence,  increases. The interpretation is that when the monitoring of primary
insurers by reinsurers is more di¢ cult, primary insurers cede more. We point
out in the introduction that the reason risk managers are di¢ cult to monitor
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in non-life business is because a long time elapses between claims occurence
and settlement. The monitoring cost cR should thus be all the larger because
the primary business is a long-tailed one. Indeed, the true production costs
of insurance are more noisily observed in this case. As a result, the prediction
of the model is that primary insurers with long-tailed business should cede
more, consistent with the ndings of Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003).
Another reason the true costs of an insurance company are more di¢ cult to
assess is that they are volatile. Consistent with this, Hassan et al. (1990)
nd that rms with more volatile gross loss ratios demand more reinsurance.
Reinsurance and informed capital. The cession rate  decreases with K
because as K increases, less outside nance is required and primary insurers,
who provide a higher proportion of the funds, must have an increasing stake in
the cash ows. In practice, rms with low inside capital are typically mutual
rms, owned by their customers only by denition. We predict that, all else
equal, these rms should be more reinsured than stock rms. Conversely, we
predict that rms with a higher level of institutional ownership should be less
reinsured, because institutional investors provide better informed capital on
average. This is consistent with recent ndings from Shortridge and Avila
(2004).
Reinsurance and cost of capital. The cession rate  increases with respect
to  because if outside investors require a higher return, then value must be
transferred from insiders to outsiders. We have stressed that an increase in
the cession rate is a mechanism to achieve this transfer in this model. This
is broadly consistent with the soft reinsurance market observed during the
late 1990s, during which time outside nance was cheap, and cession rates
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were low (see, e.g., The Worldwide Reinsurance Review, 1999). This is also
consistent with the cross-sectional ndings in Mayers and Smith (1990) that
more widely held insurers demand less reinsurance: Stakes in such companies
should be more liquid, which reduces the opportunity cost of outside capital.
3 Concluding Remarks
This paper o¤ers a model of equilibrium in reinsurance and capital mar-
kets in which reinsurers arise endogenously. The pyramidal structure of the
reinsurance market and the interaction between reinsurance and nancing
decisions are both addressed. The model, admittedly very stylized, is only a
rst step towards a theory of reinsurance, but the consistency of some of its
predictions with empirical evidence is encouraging.
The main limitation of the paper is that it does not explain why monitors
which, unlike reinsurers, do not commit capital auditing rms and rating
agencies co-exist with reinsurers in the insurance industry. An interesting
route for future research is to study the interplay of reinsurers with rating
agencies and auditors, who do not intervene directly in rmsoperations but
issue public signals about rmsquality. Aghion et al. (2004) develop a model
in which the issuance of a public signal by a "speculative" monitor increases
the incentives of an "active" monitor involved in the management of a project.
Their general approach suggests therefore that reinsurers and rating agencies
provide complement rather than substitute monitoring services.
Another limitation of the paper is the minimalist (though in line with
the view of practitioners) modelling of the interaction between the insurance
company and the policyholders or their representatives, who can only impose
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a capital requirement. A richer modelling of this interaction is an interesting
route for future research. However, this limitation has also an upside; in-
deed, it means that the point made here is fairly general and that "insurers"
could be reinterpreted as "bankers," who contemplate lending money but are
subject to a moral hazard problem. But then, why is it that the "rebankers"
arising in the model seem absent from the real world? Note rst that they are
not totally absent. Some institutions such as MBIA for municipal bonds or
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for housing loans strongly resemble reinsurers
in the credit market, as they specialize in bearing the tails of credit risks,
and this credit enhancement is a device to commit to monitor the originator.
Note also that, interestingly, reinsurers are fairly active in credit markets,
either by assuming a lot of credit reinsurance,6 or more recently by being
big players in the credit derivatives market. However, such patterns are not
as important in credit markets as they are in insurance markets, probably
because they respond to a phenomenon moral hazard due to the slow rev-
elation of production costs which is a rst-order issue in property/casualty
insurance but not in banking. Because they transform durations, distressed
retail banks typically face liquidity problems much earlier than non-life insur-
ance companies. Note that if moral hazard is not too important (K  K2),
our model predicts that the agents should carry out both primary and sec-
ondary business, very much like banks who originate loans and intervene in
the interbank market simultaneously.
6Credit insurance is indeed very reinsured.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that each insurer i 2 [0; 1] is able to underwrite her insurance portfo-
lio. Let xi denote the fraction of her capital K she uses to supply reinsurance
capacity to the other insurers. She and her reinsurers must have incentive
compatible stakes RiI and R
i
R in case of a nonnegative outcome,
RiI 
bI
p
;RiR 
cR
p
;
and the outside nanciers must at least break even,
p(R RiI  RiR)  (1 + )
 
I   (1  xi)K  KiR

;
where KiR is the capacity provided by i
0s reinsurers. Thus, necessarily
p(R  bI
p
 R cR
p
)  (1 + )  I   (1  xi)K  KiR
and the market for reinsurance capacity clears, so thatZ 1
0
xidiK =
Z 1
0
KiRdi:
Thus, integrating the above inequality between 0 and 1, one nds that a
necessary condition for each insurer underwriting her primary portfolio is
p(R  bI
p
  cR
p
)  (1 + ) (I  K) :

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Proof of Proposition 3
Recall the denitions of ; I ; and R :
 =
1
2
q
2I + 4R   I

I = 1 +
p

R  cR
p

  (1 + ) I
(1 + )K
R =
(p p)
(1 + )K
cR
p
:
Hence,
@
@I
=   
2+ I
< 0
@
@R
=
1
2+ I
> 0:
It follows that
1.  increases w.r.t. I because I decreases w.r.t. I:
2.  increases w.r.t. cR because I and R decrease and increase, respec-
tively, w.r.t. cR:
3.
@
@
=
@
@I
@I
@
+
@
@R
@R
@
Moreover,
@I
@
=   I  K
(1 + )K
  I
1 + 
@R
@
=   R
1 + 
:
Thus,
@
@
=
1
(2+ I) (1 + )



I +
I
K
  1

  R

:
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Now remember that, by denition,
I  R =  2:
Hence,
@
@
=

(2+ I) (1 + )


I
K
  1  

> 0
because the term between parentheses is nonnegative since  < I
K
  1
means that KR +K < I, which is the case in equilibrium.
We have
@
@K
=
@
@I
@I
@K
+
@
@R
@R
@K
;
and
@I
@K
=
1  I
K
@R
@K
=  R
K
:
Thus,
@
@K
=
1
(2+ I)K
( (I   1)  R) =
 2   
(2+ I)K
< 0

24
References
[1] Aghion P., Bolton P., and Tirole J. (2004) Exit Options in Corporate
Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives,Review of Finance, 8 (3), 327-
353.
[2] Berger A., Miller N., Petersen M., Rajan R., and Stein J. (2001) "Does
Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending
Practices of Large and Small Banks", mimeo University of Chicago.
[3] Borch K. (1962) Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market, Econometrica,
30, 424-444.
[4] Dewatripont M. and Tirole J. (1994) The Prudential Regulation of
Banks, MIT Press.
[5] Diamond D. (1984) "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitor-
ing", The Review of Economic Studies, 51 (3), 393-414.
[6] Doherty N. A. and Smetters K. (2002) "Moral Hazard in Reinsurance
Markets", working paper
[7] Doherty N. A. and Tinic S.M. (1981) Reinsurance under Conditions of
Capital Market Equilibrium: A Note, The Journal of Finance, 36 (4),
949-953.
[8] Garven J. R. and Lamm-Tennant J. (2003) "The Demand for Reinsur-
ance: Theory and Empirical Tests", Insurance and Risk Management,
71 (2), 217-237.
25
[9] Hassan M., Hoerger T. J., and Sloan F. (1990), "Loss Volatility, Bank-
ruptcy, and the Demand for Reinsurance", Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty, 3 (3), 221-245.
[10] Holmström B. and Tirole J. (1997) Financial Intermediation, Loanable
Funds and The Real Sector, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112,
663-692.
[11] Innes R. D. (1990) Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-
ante action choices, Journal of Economic Theory, 52 (1), 45-67.
[12] Mayers D. and Smith Jr C. W. (1990) On the Corporate Demand for
Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, Journal of Busi-
ness, 63 (1); 19-40.
[13] Swiss Re (1998) The global reinsurance market in the midst of consol-
idation, Sigma n9/1998.
[14] The Worldwide Reinsurance Review. November 1999.
[15] Tirole J. (1996) "Lecture Notes on Corporate Finance", mimeo Univer-
sity of Toulouse.
[16] Shortridge R. T. and Avila S. M. (2004) "The Impact of Institutional
Ownership on the Reinsurance Decision", Risk Management & Insur-
ance Review, 7 (2), 93-106.
[17] Weiss M. A. and Chung J. (2004), "U.S. Reinsurance Prices, Financial
Quality, and Global Capacity", Journal of Risk & Insurance, 71 (3),
437-467.
26
